“There are several theories under which a car owner, custodian or even an independent third party may be held responsible for injuries caused at the hands of another driver.
By statute, the owner of a motor vehicle is vicariously liable for death or injury to person or property resulting from the wrongful (negligent or intentional) operation of the vehicle by any person using it with the owner’s express or implied permission. By federal law, vicarious “permissive use” liability does not apply to an owner engaged in the business of renting or leasing vehicles. (But this does not affect the owner’s direct liability arising from the owner’s own negligence or criminal wrongdoing.) However, Veh.C. § 17150 does not create “true” vicarious liability … because the statute also puts a dollar cap on the owner’s exposure: Permissive use liability cannot exceed $15,000 per injury, $30,000 per occurrence, and $5,000 for property damage; nor can the driver’s punitive damages liability be imputed to the owner. Veh.C. § 17151 limits only the owner’s liability, not the driver’s; and California law requires auto insurers to provide coverage for permissive drivers under the owner’s liability policy—i.e., a permissive-use driver is always an “additional insured” under the owner’s policy. Accordingly, there will always be recourse against both the owner and the permissive-use driver under the owner’s auto insurance policy. Indeed, the permissive use statutes require the driver to be joined as defendant in an action against the owner, so long as the driver is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. The purpose of owner permissive use liability is to guaranty, to a third party injured by the operator’s negligence, at least the minimum recovery required by the Financial Responsibility Law. Where the operator settles the third party claim for an amount equal to or greater than the owner’s $15,000/$30,000/$5,000 statutory liability, the owner’s liability to the third party is discharged. The [] dollar limits do not apply if there is a separate, nonstatutory basis for imputing liability to the owner—i.e., an agency or employer-employee relationship between the owner and driver. Nor, of course, would the statutory dollar limits apply against owners held liable for their own negligence—e.g., on a theory of negligent entrustment of the vehicle or failure to maintain the vehicle in good repair. Such liability is predicated on the owner’s direct negligence, not on any theory “imputed through” the driver. Because “permission” is a key element, liability cannot be imputed to a car owner for injuries caused by a thief. Even if the owner carelessly leaves the keys in the ignition, he or she does not thereby give “permission” to third persons to use it. However, under “special circumstances,” a vehicle owner may be held independently liable for injuries caused by a person using the vehicle without permission. The “special circumstances” must be such as to create a duty to third persons in regard to the manner in which the vehicle is secured when not in use. Broadly, the “test” is one of foreseeability and whether the foreseeable risk of harm was unreasonable.
Under the common law “negligent entrustment” theory, one who “entrusts” a motor vehicle to another who is known, or from the circumstances should be known, to be incompetent or unfit to drive may be liable for injuries inflicted by the driver that were proximately caused by the driver’s incompetence. This is not a vicarious (imputed) liability situation. Rather, the defendant is charged directly with his or her own negligence in entrusting the vehicle to a person known to be likely to create an unreasonable risk of harm. Accordingly, the threshold issue is whether defendant had knowledge that the driver was incompetent or unfit to operate a motor vehicle. The “knowledge” requirement is satisfied if defendant either actually knew that the driver was incompetent or had knowledge of circumstances reasonably indicating that the driver would create an unreasonable risk of harm to others—e.g., knowledge of the driver’s youth or inexperience. In a claim for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, a vehicle owner may be deemed to have constructive knowledge that a prospective driver was incompetent or unfit to drive if a jury could reasonably find that the owner breached the duty under Veh.C. § 14604(a) to “make a reasonable effort or inquiry” into the prospective driver’s license status and allowed the driver to drive the owner’s vehicle. A defendant “entruster” who had knowledge (actual or constructive) of the driver’s incompetence cannot escape liability on the ground that he or she does not “own” the vehicle. Common law negligent entrustment liability may be imposed, e.g., on the lessee or, in an appropriate case, a car dealer or sales person. It must also be shown that the defendant “entruster” was an essential link in the chain of causation. Apart from common law negligent entrustment liability, Veh.C. § 14606 makes it unlawful knowingly to permit an unlicensed driver to operate a motor vehicle owned by or under the control of the person granting permission. Violation of this statute establishes a prima facie case of negligent entrustment; it is then up to the trier of fact to determine whether defendant was in fact negligent under the circumstances in allowing the unlicensed driver to operate the vehicle.
Other theories of recovery may render vehicle manufacturers, sellers, owners and/or drivers (as the case may be) liable for injuries traceable to the absence of proper vehicle safety restraint systems—i.e., seatbelts or air bags: Various provisions of the Vehicle Code codify California’s public policy of promoting the use of vehicle safety restraint devices (seatbelts, airbags, etc.). No “dealer” shall sell or offer for sale any “used passenger vehicle” (other than a motorcycle) manufactured after 1961 unless it is equipped with at least two front-seat passenger seatbelts; and if manufactured after 1967, the vehicle must be equipped with seatbelts for each seating position. Special warning requirements apply to any “dealer” who sells or offers for sale any “used passenger vehicle” that has a model year of 1972 to 1990 and is not equipped with both a lap belt and a shoulder harness for (i) the driver and one passenger in the front seat and (ii) at least two passengers in the rear seat. The dealer must place a statutory notice in the left front door window (or, if none, some other suitable location) recommending that shoulder harnesses be installed to increase passenger safety. [Under California’s Omnibus Traffic Safety Act (Veh.C. § 27315 et seq.): No person shall operate a “motor vehicle” (truck, truck tractor or passenger vehicle other than a motorcycle; Veh.C. § 27315(c)) on a “highway” (any street or place publicly maintained and open to vehicular traffic; Veh.C. § 360) unless the operator and all passengers 16 years of age or older are “properly restrained by a safety belt,” (except this requirement does not apply to operators of taxis transporting fare-paying passengers on city streets) (Veh.C. § 27315(d)(1) (emphasis added)); Taxi drivers shall not operate a taxi unless front seat passengers eight years of age or older are “properly restrained by a safety belt,” (Veh.C. § 27315(d)(4)); The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle (see Veh.C. § 165(a)) or a hired limousine shall not operate the respective vehicle unless the operator and front seat passengers eight years of age or older are “properly restrained by a safety belt,” (Veh.C. § 27315(d)(3)); No person 16 years of age or older shall ride as a passenger in a private motor vehicle unless “properly restrained by a safety belt,” (Veh.C. § 27315(e) (emphasis added)); Every owner of a motor vehicle operated on a highway shall maintain safety belts in “good working order” for use by the vehicle occupants (the safety belts must conform to U.S. Dept. of Transportation standards; but seatbelts need not be installed or maintained where not required by federal law applicable to the vehicle at the time of its initial sale) (Veh.C. § 27315(f)); Every sheriff’s department, city police department, and the California Highway Patrol Department, shall maintain safety belts in “good working order” for use by occupants of any vehicle which it operates on a highway for patrol purposes (the safety belts must conform to U.S. Dept. of Transportation standards; but seatbelts need not be installed or maintained where not required by federal law applicable to the vehicle at the time of its initial sale) (Veh.C. § 27315.3(b)); and All law enforcement agencies must establish a policy and issue a written order stating whether or not their officers are required to wear seatbelts (Veh.C. § 27315.5).]
Common carriers (e.g., trains, taxis, buses) have a statutory duty to use the utmost care and diligence in the safe carriage of passengers (see Civ.C. §§ 2100 & 2101). This may include a common law duty to provide safety restraint systems; and, therefore, the question of negligence and proximate causation for failure to equip the vehicle with seatbelts is a triable issue of fact for the jury. An injured driver’s or passenger’s failure to use an available seatbelt may amount to comparative negligence (so-called “seatbelt defense”). To invoke this defense, defendant must show (i) whether, in the exercise of ordinary care, plaintiff should have used the available seatbelt, and (ii) an evidentiary basis for determining use of a seatbelt would have minimized or avoided plaintiff’s injury (thus enabling the jury to assign plaintiff’s percentage of negligence). These are fact issues for the jury.”
[California Practice Guide: Personal Injury [certain citations omitted]]
